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Be Careful What You Wish For: 
Changing Doctrines, Changing Technologies  
and the Lower Cost of War 
 
 
 
The collective security structure created by the U.N. Charter is 
becoming shakier than ever, and two recent trends pose particular challenges 
to Charter rules on the use of force. The first trend involves a normative shift 
in understandings of state sovereignty, and the second trend involves 
improvements in technology -- specifically, the rapid evolution of unmanned 
aerial vehicles, precision weapons, and surveillance technologies. Each trend 
on its own raises difficult issues. Together, they further call into question 
international law’s ability to meaningfully constrain the use of force by 
states. 
 
 
1. Changes in normative understandings of sovereignty 
 
The last two decades have seen a dramatic shift away from traditional 
ideas about state soveignty.  Increasingly, both legal scholars and national 
and international-level advocates and political decision-makers have 
articulated an understanding of state sovereignty as limited and subject to 
what amounts to de facto waiver. In this vision of sovereignty, a state is 
required to execute certain responsibilities. If it fails to do so, external actors 
have a right and/or an obligation to step in themselves to ensure proper 
execution of these responsibilities.  
 
Versions of these arguments have emerged recently in two very 
different discourse communities. One is the human rights community, in 
which this vision of sovereignty is often couched in terms of atrocity 
prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Parallel versions of this 
argument have also emerged from within the national security community. 
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Here, the argument is generally couched in terms of state duties to prevent 
the export of terrorism.  
 
 
The Responsibility to Protect 
 
Start with the Responsibility to Protect. By the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, the 1990s’ debates over humanitarian intervention had 
morphed into discussion of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P, a doctrine 
initially developed by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS). In a 2001 report, ICISS offered a starkly different 
understanding of sovereignty than that taken for granted prior to World War 
II:  
 
State sovereignty implies responsibility…Where a 
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question 
is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect.1 
 
 ICISS was careful to note that the use of military force to proect 
populations should be a last resort, and that any R2P-based military 
interventions should be authorized by the Security Council. But ICISS was 
unwilling to view Security Council authorization as an absolute requirement:  
 
“If the Security Council rejects a proposal [to intervene 
to protect a population] or fails to deal with it in a reasonable 
time, alternative options…[include] action within area of 
jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent 
authorization.” 
 
 After all, warned ICISS, if the Council “fails to discharge its 
responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for 
                                                
1“The Responsibility to Protect,” December 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State  
Sovereignty, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf, emphasis added. 
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action… concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity 
and urgency of that situation…” 2  
 
 Within a decade, the R2P concept had gained substantial 
traction throughout the ineternational community.  It was referenced in the 
2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document, and in 2011, the Security 
Council referenced R2P in Resolution 1973, which authorized the use of 
force to protect civilians in Libya, as well as Resolution 1975, authorizing 
the use of force in Cote D’Ivoire.3  
 
While most post-ICISS elaborations of R2P have -- for obvious 
reasons -- tended to downplay the possibility of military interventions 
undertaken without Security Council authorization, the normative logic of 
R2P suggests that Security Council authorization should not be dispositive. 
As Anne Orford put it in her remarks, the R2P framework implies that the 
lawfulness of state authority is dependent on the capacity and will to protect 
populations from at least certain kinds of egregious harms. If sovereignty 
involves a responsibility to protect, and a state’s failure to protect its own 
population triggers a responsibility to protect in other states, this 
responsibility must logically exist whether or not a politicized and highly 
veto-prone body chooses to acknowledge it or authorize particular actions.  
 
 
Counterterrorism and the “Unwilling or Unable” Test 
 
We see strikingly similar logic at play in the counter-terrorism 
discourse, at least in the United States. Only two months before ICISS 
issued its initial report on the Responsibility to Protect, the terrorist attacks 
of September 2011 shook up traditional notions of sovereignty, self-defense, 
and armed conflict.  
 
Prior to 9/11, most states accepted (publicly, at least) the general 
international law principle that force could not be used inside the territory of 
a sovereign state unless the state at issue consented, the Security Council had 
authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the use 
of force was in self-defense following an “armed attack” as delineated by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Standard interpretations of the right to self-
                                                
2 Id., at XIII, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf 
3 S.C. Res 1973 (2011). 
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defense included the right to use force to prevent an “imminent” attack, but 
for the most part, states construed the idea of imminence relatively 
narrowly.4 
 
But the 9/11 attacks made glaringly apparent the degree to which 
globalization and its drivers (changes in transportation, communication and 
weapons technologies, for instance) had democratized the means of mass 
destruction, reduced the salience of international borders, and accelerated the 
speed with which money and materiel could travel. Inevitably, these changes 
undermined the logic of sovereign non-intervention principles—and within 
the national security community, post-9/11counterterrorism concerns 
sparked the rapid emergence of normative and legal arguments for 
expanding the basis for using force within the territory of other states.  
 
There were generally two strands to these arguments. First, the 
traditional self-defense-based justification for using force was expanded, 
most strikingly in the Bush Administration’s embrace of so-called 
“preemptive” self-defense, which was used to justify the war in Iraq. The 
logic underlying the Bush argument was straightforward (though the facts, 
inconveniently, were not):  in the age of ballistic missiles and nuclear, 
chemical, and biological threats, states may only have a moment’s notice (if 
any) before an imminent and devastating attack. Surely the framers of the 
UN Charter would not have required states to wait for such and attack to 
occur or be imminent, in the traditional sense, to lawfully use force in self-
defense. 
 
This extension of the principle of self-defense stretches traditional 
understandings of sovereignty—but the second strand of counterterrorism-
based arguments justifying the use of force raises even more fundamental 
challenges. 
 
Consider drone strikes and other cross-border uses of force outside of 
“hot” battlefields. Since 2011, the United States has repeatedly used force 
inside the borders of sovereign states with which it is not at war, at times 
without the consent of the affected state. In October 2008, for instance, US 
                                                
4 See, e.g., John Bassett Moore, The Caroline (exchange of diplomatic notes between Great Britain and the 
United States, 1842), Digest of International Law (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906) 
2: 409, 412. 
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troops in Iraq crossed the Syrian border and attacked targets inside Syria.5 
The United States has also attacked targets inside Pakistan, Yemen and 
Somalia. In some cases, the affected states have consented to the United 
States’ use of force. In other cases, their consent is, at best, questionable.6 
 
While the United States has been reluctant to offer much detail or 
legal justification for these actions, the logic relied upon appears structurally 
identical to that embraced by proponents of the Responsibility to Protect: 
sovereignty implies responsibilities as well as rights; states must refrain 
from internal acts that threaten the citizens or basic security of other states, 
and must prevent non-state entities from engaging in such acts inside their 
borders.  If a state fails to fulfill this responsibility—by, for instance, 
harboring terrorists—other states are entitled to use force within its borders 
if doing so is necessary to protect themselves or uphold global security.7 As 
President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor John Brennan stated in a 
2011 speech, “[The United States] reserve[s] the right to take unilateral 
action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the 
necessary actions themselves.”8  
 
 
The Convergence of Sovereignty-Limiting Theories 
 
The human rights and national security discourses appear to be 
converging on structurally parallel sovereignty-limiting theories, and each 
serves to legitimize and reinforce the other, though neither the human rights 
community nor the national security community is inclined to fully 
acknowledge this.   
 
One might even say that the R2P coin ought logically to be seen as 
having two sides: On one side lies a state’s duty to take action inside its own 
territory to protect its own population from violence and atrocities. On the 
                                                
5 See, e.g, Council on Foreign Relations, “Cross-Border Attack on Syria Raises Iranian Eyebrows,” 
available at http://www.cfr.org/iran/cross-border-attack-syria-raises-iranian-eyebrows/p17648 
6 One difficulty is raised by the fact that the affected state may agree in private to allow US strikes but 
object in public. This, and the secrecy surrounding most of these strikes, makes it difficult to fully evaluate 
the degree to which consent has been obtained.  
7 See, e.g., UN Security Council in Resolution 1373, which notes that state must prevent and suppress, in 
their territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism. SC Res 
1373 (2001). 
8 John O. Brennan, “Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws” (Remarks by John 
Brennan, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, 16 September 2011),   http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an 
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other side lies a state’s duty to take action inside its own territory to protect 
other states’ populations from violence. Either way, a state that fails in these 
protective duties faces the prospect that other states will intervene in its 
“internal” affairs without its consent, and quite possibly without the Security 
Council’s consent. 
 
To be clear, my purpose here is descriptive rather than prescriptive.  I 
do not assert that any of this is either wise or particularly close to being 
settled law. R2P’s scope, meaning and legal status remain controversial, and 
the US legal defense of recent drone strikes and other cross-border uses of 
force is even more so. Nonetheless, each of these normative frameworks is 
articulated with increasing frequency, each is couched in legal terms, and 
each offers the raw materials from which states and other actors can 
construct legally plausible arguments.  
 
In and of themselves, these arguments raise obvious and glaring issues 
for those concerned with the international rule of law. Whether a potential 
use of force is justified on counterterrorism grounds or on humanitarian and 
human rights grounds, the slippery slope is apparent. Who gets to judge 
when a state should be deemed to have "waived" its sovereignty and 
abrogated its responsibilities? Who gets to decide when a use of force inside 
the border of a non-consenting state is lawful? How much force is 
acceptable? And which actors get to use force? A single state acting 
unilaterally? Regional organizations? Coalitions of the willing?  
 
If each state begins to claim the right to judge for itself when force 
can be used inside the borders of another state, the world will become an 
even more frightening and unstable place, given the continued weakness of 
most existing international institutions.  
 
 
 
2. Changing Technologies 
 
The rapid evolution of these sovereignty-limiting doctrines has been 
paralleled by a similarly rapid evolution in technologies that collectively 
make cross-border uses of force less costly. Surveillance technologies have 
improved dramatically in the last two decades, enabling powerful states to 
more effectively and accurately determine the location, numbers and 
motivations of actors they deem to pose security threats. Weapons 
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technologies and delivery systems have also improved, enabling greater 
precision in targetting and less collateral damage. And the development of 
increasingly sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) not only assists 
with intelligence-gathering and precision-targetting, but eliminates any 
immediate risk to the military or intelligence personnel who control them.  
 
Taken together, these technological changes reduce the risks and costs 
of using force inside the borders of other sovereign states. Unmanned aerial 
vehicles in particular have become a game-changer for the United States: 
they’re substantially cheaper to make and maintain than manned aircraft; 
they can spend much more “time on target,” which increases the likelihood 
that a given strike will hit its only its intended target (rather than nearby 
civilians, for instance), and their use poses no risk to their operators, who 
remain safely far from the strike zone. 
 
 Compared to the methods available even fifteen years ago, today’s 
surveillance and weapons technologies permit states to use force at lower 
cost in both monetary and human terms.  When targets are limited and well-
defined, states no longer need to risk the lives of ground troops or human 
pilots to strike targets, and can feel more confident that there will be no 
significant civilian deaths (thus reducing the odds of international 
condemnation). Strikes become more “surgical.” And this seems likely to 
produce changes in state behavior:  if states perceive the costs of using force 
to be lower, their willingness to use force will be higher.  
 
 
3. When legal and technological trends intersect 
 
The collective security structures created by the UN Charter have 
always been shaky.  Since its inception, the Charter’s rules on the use of 
force have been stretched and strained. Nonetheless, states have hesitated to 
pose direct challenges to the Charter framework, and it has so far maintained 
a fragile integrity.  
 
This may be in the process of changing. When sovereignty-limiting 
theories such as R2P and the “unwilling or unable” counterterrorism 
framework are available to states, the perceived reputational costs of using 
force inside the borders of other sovereign states will go down. Combine 
these normative and doctrinal developments with technological changes that 
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reduce the financial and human cost of using of force inside other states 
borders, and the threshold for using force will get lower still. 
 
Proponents of R2P and counter-terrorism based sovereignty-limiting 
theories need to acknowledge that both directly challenge the UN Charter’s 
collective security framework.  This may not be a bad thing: the world we 
live in has changed substantially since 1945, both in terms of widely shared 
normative assumptions and in terms of technology and risk.  
 
But if the Charter system is being tacitly jettisoned, the least we can 
do is acknowledge it, and begin the difficult project of developing new rules 
and institutions to preserve peace in this new era. If we don’t, we risk a 
return to the Hobbesian international order the Charter was designed to 
eliminate. 
 
 
 
 
